This paper presents two transformations of public-coin/Arthur-Merlin proof systems which are zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier into (public-coin/ArthurMerlin) proof systems which are zero-knowledge with respect to any verifier.
sent by the verifier (in each round) are replaced by a multi-round interactive hashing protocol, which in turn originates in the work of Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [22] . Instead, in our transformation, the random messages sent by the verifier are replaced by a 3 2 -round protocol, called Random Selection. The Random Selection protocol uses a family of ordinary hashing functions; specifically, we use a family of t-wise indepedent functions, for some parameter t (which is polynomial in the input length).
We believe that the Random Selection protocol may be of independent interest. Thus, a few words are in place. The goal of this protocol is to allow two parties to select a "random" n-bit string. There is a parameter " which governs the quality of this selection and the requirement is asymmetric with respect to the two parties. Firstly, it is required that if the first party follows the protocol then, no matter how the second player plays, the output of the protocol will be at most " away (in norm-1) from uniform. Secondly, it is required that if the second party follows the protocol then, no matter how the first player plays, no string will appear as output of the protocol with probability greater than poly(n=") 2 ?n . Our Random Selection protocol has the additional property of being simulatable in the sense that, given a possible outcome, it is easy to generate a (random) transcript of the protocol which ends with this outcome.
Other Related Work
The idea of transforming honest verifier zero-knowledge into zero-knowledge in general was first studied by Bellare, Micali and Ostrovsky [2] . Their transformation needed a computational assumption of a specific algebraic type. Since then several constructions have reduced the computational assumptions needed. The latest in this line of work is by Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [23] , who give a transformation which is based on interactive hashing and preserved statistical zero-knowledge. Their transformation relies on existence of a one-way permutation. The transformation works for any protocol, provided that the verifier is probabilistic polynomial-time.
In the other part of this paper, a secure commitment scheme 3 is used to transform honestverifier zero-knowledge Arthur-Merlin proofs (with unbounded number of rounds) into (general) zero-knowledge Arthur-Merlin proofs. This transformation increases the round-complexity of the proof system by an additive term which is linear in the number of coin tosses used in the original proof system.
An indirect way of converting protocols which are zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier into ones which are zero-knowledge in general, is available through a recent result of Ostrovsky and Wigderson [24] . They have proved that the existence of honest verifier zero-knowledge proof system for a language which is "hard on the average" implies the existence of one-way functions. Combined with the results of [14] and [19, 3] , this yields a (computational and general) zero-knowledge proof for the same language. Thus, computational honest-verifier zero-knowledge interactive proofs, for "hard on the average" languages, get transformed into computational zeroknowledge interactive proofs for these languages. However, perfect honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs (for such languages) do not get transformed into perfect zero-knowledge proofs.
A two-party protocol for random selection, with unrelated properties, has been presented in [10] . This protocol guarantees that, as long as one party plays honestly, the outcome of the protocol hits any set S f0;1g n with probability at mostÕ( p jSj=2 n ), whereÕ(") def = " polylog(1=").
Another two-party protocol for random selection, with other unrelated properties, has been presented in [13] . Loosely speaking, this protocol allows a computationally restricted party, interacting with a powerful and yet untrustful party, to uniformly select an element in an easily recognizable set S f0;1g n .
Remarks Concerning this Part of the Paper
We use the standard definitions of interactive proofs and zero-knowledge, except for the following minor modification. We require the simulator (in the definition of zero-knowledge) to to run in strictly polynomial-time (rather than in expected polynomial-time), but we allow it to produce output only with some non-negligible probability (rather than always). Clearly, this definition implies the standard one, but the converse is not known to hold -see [9] . This definition is more convenient for establishing zero-knowledge claims and in particular for our purposes, but our results do not depend on it (and can be derived under the standard definitions).
Due to space limitations the proofs of all propositions have been omitted. The complete proofs appear in our technical report [7] .
Random Selection
We consider a randomized two-party protocol for selecting strings. The two parties to the protocol are called the challenger and the responder. These names are supposed to reflect the asymmetric requirements (presented below) as well as the usage of the protocol in our zero-knowledge transformation. Loosely speaking, we require that if the challenger follows the protocol then, no matter which strategy is used by the responder, the output of the protocol is almost uniformly distributed; if the responder follows the protocol then, no string may appear with probability much greater than its probability under the uniform distribution. Furthermore, for any string which may appear as output, when an arbitrary challenger strategy is used, one can efficiently generate a random transcript of that protocol ending with this output. We postpone the formal specification of these properties to the analysis of the protocol presented below. Actually, we present two version of the protocol.
Construction 1 (Random Selection Protocol -two versions):
Let n and m < n be integers 4 
, and
Hn;m be a family of functions, each mapping the set of n-bit long strings onto 5 We remark that if version 1 is used and both parties follow the protocol then the output is uniformly distributed in f0;1g n . However, the interesting case is when one of the parties deviates from the protocol. In this case, the protocol can be guaranteed to produce "good" output, provided that "good" families of hash functions are being used as Hn;m. These functions must have relatively succient representation as well as strong random properties. Furthermore, given a function h, it should be easy to evaluate h on a given image and to generate a random preimage (of a given range element) under h. Using the algorithmic properties of Hn;m it follows that the instructions specified in the above protocol can be implemented in probabilistic poly(n=")-time, which for " = 1=poly(n) means poly(n)-time. 4 In particular, we will use m def = n ? 4 log 2 (n="), where " is an error-bound parameter. 5 We stress that each function in Hn;m rages over all f0;1g m . Thus, the challenger may always respond in step C2 even if the responder deviates from the protocol or version 2 is used.
In the sequel, we will use the family Hn;m def = H n n;m . We now list the following, easy to verify, properties of the above family.
P1
There is a poly(n)-time algorithm that, on input a function h 2 H t n;m and a string x 2 f0;1g n , outputs h(x).
P2
The number of preimages of an image y under h 2 H t n;m is bounded above by 2 n?m t; furthermore, there exists a poly(2 n?m t)-time algorithm that, on input y and h, outputs the set h ?1 (y) def = fx:h(x)=yg. (The algorithm works by trying all possible extensions of y to an element of GF(2 t ); for each such extension it remains to find the roots of a degree t ? 1 polynomial over the field.) P3 H t n;m is a family of almost t-wise independent hashing functions in the following sense: for every t distinct images, x1; :::;xt 2 (f0; 1g n ?f0; 1g m 0 n?m ), for a uniformly chosen h 2 H t n;m , the random variables h(x1); :::;h(xt) are indepedently and uniformly distributed in f0;1g m .
The output distribution for honest challeger
We now turn to analyze the output distribution of the above protocol, assuming that the challenger plays according to the protocol. In the analysis we allow the responder to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol and thus as far as this analysis goes the two versions in Construction 1 are equivalent.
The analysis is done using the "random" properties of the family H t n;m . Recall that the statistical difference between two random variable X and Y is 1 2
We say that X is "-away from Y if the statistical difference between them is ". 
The output distribution for honest responder
We now show that no matter what strategy is used by the challenger, if the responder follows the protocol then the set of possible outputs of the protocol must constitute a non-negligible fraction of the set of n-bit long strings. This claim holds for both versions of Construction 1. Furthermore, we show that no single string may appear with probability which is much more than 2 ?n (i.e., its probability weight under the uniform distribution).
Proposition 2 Suppose that Hn;m = H t n;m is a family of hashing functions satisfying property (P2),
for some t = poly(n). Let C be an arbitrary challenger strategy. Then, for every x 2 f0;1g n , the probability that an execution of version 1 of the protocol with challenger strategy C ends with output x is at most (t 2 n?m ) 2 ?n . 
Simultability property of the protocol
We conclude the analysis of the above protocol by showing that, one can efficiently generate random transcripts of the protocol having a given outcome. Throughout this analysis, we assume that the responder follows the instruction specified by the protocol. As in the proof of the last two propositions, it suffices to consider an arbitrary deterministic challenger strategy, denoted c. Now, suppose that Hn;m = H t n;m is a family of hashing functions satisfying property (P1), for some t = poly(n). Then, on input x and access to a function c : f0;1g 7 !f0; 1g , we can easily test if c(h(x)) = x, where h def = c( ). In case the above condition holds, the triple (h; h(x); x)
is the only transcript of the execution of the protocol, with challenger strategy c, which ends with output x. Otherwise, there is no execution of the protocol, with challenger strategy c, which ends with output x. Thus, 
Setting the Parameters
Proposition 1 motivates us to set " (the parameter governing the approximation of the output in case of honest challenger) as small as possible. On the other hand, Propositions 2 and 3 motivates us to maintain the difference n ? m small and in paricular logarithmic (in n). Recalling that n ? m = 4 log 2 (n="), this suggests setting " = 1=p(n) for some fixed positive polynomial p.
The Zero-Knowledge Transformation
Our transformation is restricted to interactive proofs in which the verifier sends the outcome of every coin it tosses. Such interactive proofs are called Arthur-Merlin games [1] or public-coins interactive proofs (cf., [17] ). Note that in such interactive proofs the verifier moves, save the last, may consist merely of tossing coins and sending their outcome. (In its last move the verifier decides, based on the entire history of the communication, whether to accept the input or not.) Without loss of generality, we may assume that in every round of such an interactive proof the verifier tosses at least 4 log(jxj=")
coins, where x is the common input to the interactive proof and " specifies the desired bound on the statistical distance (between one round in the resulting interactive proof and the original one). Furthermore, assume for sake of simplicity that at each round the verifier tosses the same number of coins, denoted n.
The Transformation
In the following description, we use the second version of the Random Selection protocol presented in Construction 1. This simplifies the construction of the simulator for the transformed interactive proof. The first version can be used as well, at the expense of some modification in the simulator construction.
The protocol transformation consists of replacing each verifier move (except the last, decision move) by an execution of the Random Selection protocol, in which the verifier plays the role of the challenger and the prover plays the role of the responder. 
Preservation of Completeness and Soundness
In this subsection, we may assume that V 0 follows the interactive proof. Thus, if for some x 2 f0; 1g , prover P always convinces V on common input x then P 0 always convinces V 0 on this common input. We stress that both V 0 and P 0 run in polynomial-time when given oracle access to V and P, respectively. Thus, the new verifier is a legitimate one. Furthermore, if the original prover P, working in polynomial-time with help of a suitable auxiliary input, could convince the original verifier to accept some common input, then the resulting prover P 0 could do the same (i.e., can convince V 0 to accept this common input, while working in polynomial-time with help of the same auxiliary input).
We have just seen that the completeness properties of the original interactive proof is preserved, by the transformation, in a strong sense. Soundness properties are preserved as well, but with some slackness which results from the imperfectness of the Random Selection protocol. In particular, Proposition 5 Let : f0;1g 7 ! 0; 1] be a function bounding the probability that verifier V accepts inputs when interacting with any (possibly cheating) prover. Namely, (x) is a bound on the probability that V accepts x. Suppose that on input x, the interactive proof (P; V ) runs for t(jxj) rounds. Then, 0 (x) def = (x)+O(t(jxj) "(jxj))is a function bounding the probability that verifier V 0 accepts inputs when interacting with any (possibly cheating) prover.
proof:
Recall that V 0 plays the role of the challenger in the Random Selection protocol. Thus, the proposition follows quite immediately from Proposition 1.
We stress that the above proposition remains valid no matter which of the two version of Random Selection is used. The same holds with respect to the comments regarding completeness (made above).
Zero-Knowledge
In this subsection, we may assume that P 0 follows the interactive proof. Assuming that P is zero-knowledge with respect to the verifier V , we prove that P 0 is zero-knowledge with respect to any probabilistic polynomial-time verifier strategy. This statement holds for the three versions of zero-knowledge; specifically, perfect, almost-perfect (statistical), and computational zero-knowledge.
Proposition 6 Let (P; V ) be a constant-round Arthur-Merlin interactive proof. Suppose that P is
perfect (resp. almost-perfect) [resp. computational] zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier V over the set L f0;1g . Then P 0 is perfect (resp. almost-perfect) [resp. computational] zero-knowledge (with respect to any probabilistic polynomail-time verifier) over the set L f0; 1g .
A few comments regarding the proof: Let M be a simulator witnessing the hypothesis of the proposition.
Then, for every x 2 L, with non-negligible probability M(x) halts with output, and given that this happens the output has distributed indistinguishable from that of (P; V )(x). For every verifier strategy V interacting with P 0 , we construct a simulator M , which uses M and V as blackboxes, as follows. By uniformly selecting and fixing coin tosses for V , we may assume that V is deterministic.
On input x, the simulator M invokes M and assuming M(x)haltswithoutput, sets (r1; 1; :::;rt; t) def = M(x); otherwise M also halts with no output. The simulator M now tries to form transcripts of the Random Selection protocol which end with output r1, r2 through rt, respectively. (Here we use the simulatability of the Random Selection protocol.) A transcript with output r1 is formed as follows. M feeds V with input x and obtains h1, which can be assumed as in Propositions 2 and 3 to be in Hn;m. Next, M computes a1 = h1(r1) and feeds V with (x; a1). If V replies with r1, we've succeeded in forming a transcript for the first invokation of Random Selection and we proceed to the next. (This happens with non-negligible probability.) Otherwise, M halts with no output. We note that for the next invokations of Random Selection, V is fed with the entire history so far; for example, to obtain h2 we feed V with (x; a1; 1) and next we feed it with (x; a1; 1; a2), where a2 = h2(r2). If all t rounds were completed successfully 6 , M halts with output (h1; a1; r1; 1; :::;ht; at; rt; t).
To complete the proof we prove six claims. Firstly, we show that in each of the three cases (perfect, almost-perfect, or computational zero-knowledge), the simulator M produces output with non-negligible probability. Secondly, for each of the three cases, we establish the required relationship between the transcript of the real interaction and the output of the simulator. As expected, the proofs become more involved as we move from perfect to computational zero-knowledge.
The above proposition remains valid even if one uses the first version of the Random Selection protocol. However, a slightly more complex simulator will have to be used. The reason being that in the first version (of the Random Selection protocol) the ai's are not selected uniformly but are rather weighted by the number of their preimages under the corresponding hi's. Thus, ri's which are mapped to ai's with small preimage may be less likely in the real interactions. To compensate for this phenomenon, one may modify the simulator so that it skews the probabilities in the same manner.
Namely, when producing a transcript with less likely ri's, the simulator will discard it with some probability. The required probability (with which to discard transcripts) can be easily computed.
Conclusions
Combining Propositions 5 and 6, we get Theorem 1 does not preserve the error probability of the original system. This seems inevitible, in light of [12] . Recall that there are languages believed not to be in BPP which have constant-round Arthur-Merlin proof systems, with exponentially small error probability, which are zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier. For example, Graph Isomorphism has such a system (for perfect zero-knowledge), and assuming the existence of one-way functions, every language in NP has such a system (for computational zero-knowledge) [14] . Now, a stronger version of Theorem 1, say one in which 0 (n) ? (n) is a negligible function of n, would imply that these languages have constantround Arthur-Merlin (balck-box) zero-knowledge proof systems (with negligible error probability). But, according to [12] , languages having constant-round Arthur-Merlin (balck-box) zero-knowledge proof systems lie in BPP. Needless to say that NP and even Graph Non-Isomorphism are believed not to lie in BPP.
We now compare the round complexity of the protocols resulting from our transformation to those resulting from Damgård's transformation of [6] . Suppose we start with a c-round proof system which uses r(n) random coins and has error (n). Clearly, (n) 2 ?r(n) and r(n) > log 2 n (otherwise the language is in BPP [15] ). Now, the proof system resulting from Damgård's transformation will have c + r(n) rounds and maintain the error bound of the original proof system. On the other hand, the protocol resulting from our transformation will have 2c rounds and error (n) + 1 poly(n)
. In case (n) is non-negligible, we have a clear advatage. Otherwise, to make the comparison fair, we use sequentail repetitions to reduce the error in the protocols resulting from our transformation to the bound (n). This requires log poly(n) (1= (n)) repetitions yielding round complexity bounded by log 2 (1= (n)) log 2 n r(n) log 2 n . (Typically, (n) is much larger than 2 ?r(n) .)
Part II
Using Commitment Schemes to Simplify Zero-Knowledge Protocol Design 7
Introduction to Part II
In this part, we will show another transformation, which can be applied to arbitrary number of round statistical zero-knowledge proofs, assuming the existence of secure commitment schemes (i.e., one-way functions [18, 20] ). This assumption can be replaced by the restriction on the applicable languages, that they are "hard on the average" (not in AVBPP) [24] .
This result can be considered to improve the two previous results partially: one is the result by Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [23] and the other is by Damgård [6] (see Introduction of Part I). That is, our result generalizes the assumption of [23] , from one-way permutations to one-way functions, although our transformation is only applicable to public coin proof systems. On the other hand, this result relaxes the round complexity restriction for applicable proof systems, from constant number of rounds to arbitrary number of rounds, although our transformation does not preserve perfect zero-knowledge, and the applicable languages should not be in AVBPP.
The technique of using the bit-commitment for the transformation can be also applied to the argument model [4] . In this transformation, the roles of the committer and receiver are reversed (i.e., the verifier is the committer.) 
Proof
Let (M; A) be a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin proof against a "honest verifier", A, for language L. Then we will construct a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin proof, (M ; A ), against any verifier, A , for L. where n is the size of x.
Suppose that the conversation of (M; A)(x) is ( 1; 1; : : : ; k; k), where i (i = 1; : : : ; k) is the i-th public coin message by A, and i is the i-th message by M. Let li be the (bit) size of i.
Let BC be Naor's bit-commitment function based on a pseudo-random generator, G, [20] . That is, Naor's bit-commitment protocol is as follows: C sends s and b to R, and R checks the validity.
A pseudo-random generator exits if and only if a one-way function exists [18] .
Next, we show the protocol of (M ; A ) using Naor's bit-commitment protocol. On the other hand, from the condition of Naor's bit-commitment, the committer ( f M ) can change the committed value with probability at most 1=2 n . Since A sends a true random bits cI (for I = 1; : : : ; li; i = 1; : : : ; k), e (i) I is uniformly distributed with probability greater than 1 ?1=2 n . Hence, ( 1; : : : ; k) = (e (1) 1 ; : : : ; e (k) l k ) is uniformly distributed with probability greater (n) . Therefore, the probability that ( 1; : : : ; k) 2 ? is at most (1=2 n )(1 ? (n)) + (n) < (n). Thus, in each procedure, the expected repetition number is less than 1=(1=2 ? (n)) < 2 + 4 (n).
Protocol (M ; A )
Clearly, after procedure i; I] is completed, the simulated conversation from 1; 1] to i; I] is not affected by the following procedures. (i.e., there is no back-track.) Hence, totally, e S terminates in expected time of polynomial (i.e., O(2( P k i=1 l1) T); where T is the running time of each procedure described above).
Next, we will show that the simulated conversation is statistically close to the real conversation.
Since this is a black-box simulation, if the simulated messages of M is statistically close to the real messages, then the total simulation is also statistically close to the real conversation.
To prove this, it is sufficient to show that the simulated i is statistically close to the real one. Since Thus, the simulated i is statistically close to the real one.
2
We can immediately obtain the following corollary from Theorem 2 and [24] . 
